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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF GREATER 
NEW YORK, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 100, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NOS. CP-768 & CP-769 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
- and -
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
) AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE (STUART LICHTEN of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(ROBERT DRINAN and MICHELE SHERIDAN of counsel), for Employer 
JOEL GILLER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARY O'CONNELL of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Transport Workers Union of 
Greater New York, AFL-CIO, Local 100 (TWU) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) that found the titles of telecommunications specialist and computer 
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specialist, employed by the New York City Transit Authority (Authority), were most 
appropriately placed in the unit represented by District Council 37, American Federation 
of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (DC 37). 
EXCEPTIONS 
TWU excepts to the ALJ's decision that the at-issue titles share a greater 
community of interest with the unit represented by DC 37 on the basis of duties, 
promotions, benefits, rules and regulations, and salary. The Authority and DC 37 filed 
separate responses in support of the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
A full exposition of the facts is recited in the ALJ's decision.1 We will confine our 
review to the salient facts relevant to our consideration of the exceptions. 
On August 15, 2001, the TWU filed two petitions, one for the title of computer 
specialist (software) I, II, III and IV (CP-768) and the second, for the title of 
telecommunications specialist (voice) I, II, III and IV (CP-769). Both petitions argued 
that the titles are either encompassed within the scope of TWU's existing unit or that the 
titles should be placed in the unit 
The Authority contended that the at-issue titles should be placed in a separate 
unit. In the alternative, the Authority argued that DC 37's bargaining unit is the 
appropriate placement of these titles. DC 37 thereafter intervened in the proceedings. 
Both proceedings were consolidated for hearing by consent of the parties. 
1
 36 PERB 1J4009 (2003). 
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TWU represents hourly paid operating and maintenance employees of the 
Authority in such titles as telephone maintenance and signal maintenance. TWU 
contends that the at-issue titles perform similar work. 
DC 37 represents certain employees of the Authority who are members of 
various DC 37 locals. DC 37 contends that the at-issue titles share a community of 
interest with computer-related titles found in one of its locals, Local 2627. 
The Authority employs telecommunications specialists in its department of 
telecommunications and information services (TIS), division of telecommunications. 
The Authority also employs computer specialists at the TIS. The chief of the Authority's 
division of telecommunications, Leonard Ciaccio, testified that the telecommunications 
division is organized into five categories: manager, professional, technical and 
engineering (PT&E), administrative and clerical supervisors, and hourly. It is within the 
PT&E category that the titles of telecommunication specialist and computer specialist 
are found. 
The titles of telephone maintainer and signal maintainer are in the category of 
hourly employees. TWU represents hourly employees in the TIS division. TWU does 
not represent employees in the PT&E category of the TIS. 
Although DC 37 does not represent the titles of telecommunications specialist 
and computer specialist, the salary and benefits received by DC 37-represented 
employees are applied by the Authority to the unrepresented employees in the TIS 
division, PT&E group. 
The record established that there is a marked difference in terms and conditions 
of employment for employees in the PT&E category versus hourly employees. PT&E 
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employees are hired after the submission of an application, resume and an open-
competitive exam. Hourly employees are hired from a civil service list compiled from an 
examination for the position. PT&E employees report to someone in a manager title, 
whereas hourly employees report to a supervisor. PT&E employees are assigned work 
by a manager; conversely, hourly employees receive their assignment from a 
supervisor. There is no seniority in work assignment or location for PT&E employees. 
They work a 35-hour work week. Hourly employees work a 40-hour work week. PT&E 
employees are salaried employees and do not receive overtime for work over 35 hours. 
Instead, PT&E employees receive compensatory time. They receive a pay raise 
whenever DC 37-represented employees receive a pay raise. Hourly employees 
receive pay raises as a direct consequence of the collectively negotiated contract 
between the TWU and the Authority. 
The Authority called John Sporano, the general superintendent of allocation 
management. He had previously worked as a telephone maintainer and a supervisor 
M/S 1. In his current position, he supervises approximately seventy employees, some 
of whom are in TWU's unit and two of whom are in DC 37. He described the work of a 
telecommunications specialist as design, research, development, contract comment, 
write procedures and perform factory tests. They may assist the maintainers and, if 
they need help doing a test, the specialist will show them how the test is done. Sporano 
then characterized the work of telephone maintainers as installers of equipment. 
DC 37 called Thomas Buneo, a telecommunications specialist, level one, to 
testify about his duties. He works in a section with eleven planners where he receives 
telecommunication request forms from fellow Authority employees. Each planner then 
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visits the site, makes a survey, determines the needs, makes recommendations and 
submits it to his supervisor. 
The next witness DC 37 called, Anne Renton, a telecommunications specialist, 
testified that she works in the customer service center and receives calls from the help 
desk. She analyzes the problem to determine if it is a software, hardware or networking 
problem. She then gets the proper vendor or Authority personnel assigned to correct 
the problem. 
TWU called David Blozen, a telephone maintainer, as a witness. He testified that 
his duties have been to function as a fiber optic network technician. The work is 
installing and repairing multiplexer MUX banks. He described how the work of 
telecommunications specialists and maintainer overlaps. However, on cross-
examination, Blozen testified that he never reviewed contracts and he has never worked 
side by side with a telecommunications specialist. 
TWU called Kevin McCawley as a witness. McCawley, a telephone maintainer, 
is also vice chair, telephone department chairman of the TWU local. He testified 
regarding the duties of a maintainer which include maintenance, trouble shooting, 
repair, testing and installation. On cross-examination, McCawley testified that he has 
never worked with a telecommunications specialist. 
The Authority called Robert OTara, the vice president and chief information 
officer for the Authority. He described the various titles that he has held, including 
computer specialist I and II. As a computer specialist, OTara testified that a 
requirement of the position includes supervision over other employees. Also, the 
position is more of the system-related type of work. He opined that a computer 
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specialist would have to have knowledge of databases and a strong programming 
language background. 
The titles in the line of promotion to computer specialist are programmer analyst 
trainee, programmer analyst and computer associate. These titles are currently 
represented by DC 37. 
The signal maintainer duties are to maintain, repair, test and inspect signal 
equipment. Winton Habersham, general superintendent in technology signals, testified 
on behalf of the Authority. He previously worked as a signal maintainer and tesitified 
that a signal maintainer could not perform the work of a computer.specialist because a 
computer specialist possesses knowledge and experience beyond that of a signal 
maintainer. 
Edward Hissick, president of Local 2627 of DC 37, testified about the various 
titles Local 2627 represents in the TIS department. 
Henry Williams, employed as a signal maintainer by the Authority, was called to 
testify on behalf of the TWU and explain the work of a signal maintainer. He testified 
that he worked with a computer specialist at a job site and that he observed the 
computer specialist doing some of the same job duties that signal maintainers perform. 
However, on cross-examination, Williams acknowledged that he did not meet the 
qualifications as a computer specialist. 
The last witness the Authority called, John Weinberger, is the assistant chief 
officer, Metrocard operations, Automated Fee Collection (AFC), Maintenance Subway 
Operations. Weinberger testified about his experience in supervising computer 
associates and computer specialists in AFC operations. He also described the duties of 
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a revenue equipment maintainer, testifying that their prime responsibilities include 
prevention and corrective maintenance on the AFC equipment, the station level 
equipment turnstiles and vending equipment. He also contrasted the work of a 
computer associate and computer specialist. The primary function of a computer 
specialist within the Metrocard operation is to monitor the AFC network remotely from 
the mainframe computer down to the station level equipment. The difference between 
the two computer titles lay mainly with their degree of knowledge and experience. 
TWU called Peter Foley, an employee of TWU while on leave of absence from 
the Authority. Foley's position with the Authority is revenue maintainer. In that capacity, 
Foley explained that he works with computer-based revenue equipment in the 
Metrocard operation. Foley testified that he maintains and repairs the revenue 
equipment through the use of a laptop computer. He is assigned to the AFC 
department, Metrocard Operation, and opined that the revenue maintainer and the 
computer specialists in the Metrocard Operations performed the same duties. However, 
he acknowledged on cross-examination that he does not have the qualifications to be a 
computer specialist (software). 
DISCUSSION 
TWU contends in its principal exception that the ALJ erred in finding that the at-
issue titles share a greater community of interest with employees represented by DC 
37. We disagree. 
The TWU filed both a unit clarification and a unit placement petition for the at-
issue titles. The ALJ dismissed the unit clarification petition and TWU has not excepted 
to that ruling. 
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With regard to the unit placement petition, however, TWU argues that the ALJ 
misapplied our decisions in reaching his conclusion that the at-issue titles share a 
greater community of interest with DC 37. We have held that "[a] unit placement 
petition is a mini-representation proceeding which puts the appropriateness of the unit 
under §207 of the Act in issue."2 Moreover, the unit placement petition proceeds from 
the finding or admission that the position [at issue] is not in the petitioner's unit, but 
should be most appropriately placed there.3 
Community of interest and administrative convenience are relevant to consider in 
the placement issue. The record before us supports the finding of the ALJ that the at-
issue titles are most appropriately placed in the unit of computer-related titles 
represented by DC 37. Some of the work of the at-issue titles, such as analyzing 
problems, testing equipment, and using a database, is similar, in some respects, to the 
work of the titles represented by TWU. However, as that work relates to the design, 
research, development of tests and procedures and contract review, the at-issue titles 
are more closely involved with the Authority's telecommunications and computer 
systems, as are the titles in the computer unit represented by DC 37. 
In Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York,4 we 
reviewed the Director's decision placing telecommunications specialists in DC 37 Local 
2627's unit of computer-related job titles. We found there, as we do here, that the 
2
 Rye City Sch. Dist, 33 PERB ^[3053, at 3145 (2000). 
3
 Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 26 PERB 1J4049 (1993), 
aff'd, 27 PERB 1J3026 (1994). 
4
 Id. 
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telecommunications titles and the computer-related titles share the same goals and 
objectives, have common supervision, more education and greater expertise than the 
hourly titles in TWU's unit. Thus, for the reasons more fully explained by the ALJ, the 
at-issue titles share more significant terms and conditions of employment with the 
employees represented by DC 37 than those few terms and conditions they share with 
employees in TWU's unit. 
The other uniting criterion contained in §207 of the Act, administrative 
convenience, was considered by the ALJ. The Authority argued in its answer that the 
at-issue titles should be placed in separate units or, in the alternative, placed in an 
existing unit of DC 37. The ALJ found that placing the at-issue titles in separate units 
would be counterproductive to negotiations, especially since there is no evidence in the 
record to support such separation. The Authority's alternative argument supported 
placing the titles in an existing unit of DC 37. We have held that the administrative 
convenience criterion requires weight to be given to an employer's uniting preference.5 
In this particular case, the factors considered under community of interest and the 
Authority's mission are supported by placement of the titles of computer specialist 
(software) I, II, III and IV and telecommunications specialist (voice) I, II, III and IV into 
DC 37's unit. 
Accordingly, we hereby add the titles of computer specialist and 
telecommunications specialist to the unit represented by DC 37.6 
5
 Malone Cent. Sch. Dist, 31 PERB lf3050 (1998). 
6
 The majority status of the unit is not placed in issue by the accretion of these titles, 
therefore, no election is ordered. Hammondsport Cent. Sch. Dist, 33 PERB 1J3036 
(2000); New York Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 27 PERB 1J3034 (1994). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petitions filed by TWU in the instant 
proceeding must be, and they hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: October 31, 2003 
Albany, New York 
—""** 1/l/l^cA^ 
Micbael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
1) 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
r 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-22682 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF MENTAL 
HEALTH - SOUTH BEACH PSYCHIATRIC CENTER), 
Respondent, 
-and-
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Intervenor. 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
LISA WILLIS, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Office of 
Mental Health-South Beach Psychiatric Center) (State) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), on an improper practice charge filed by the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) alleging that the State violated §209-a.1(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally entered into an 
agreement with the State University of New York (SUNY) for the provision of pharmacy 
management services by SUNY's Downstate Medical Center (Center) at the South 
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Beach Psychiatric Center (South Beach). PEF alleged in its charge that such services 
had been exclusively provided by PEF unit members. United University Professions 
(UUP), representing the employees at the Center, intervened in the proceeding and 
became a party for all purposes.1 
The ALJ found that the State violated the Act when it transferred management of 
the pharmacy at South Beach to the Center. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The State filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision and provided proof of service of 
those exceptions on PEF, but not on UUP. The State thereafter requested an extension 
of time to file its exceptions on UUP, arguing that UUP was inadvertently not served and 
that UUP consented to the late service. PEF filed a motion to dismiss the State's 
exceptions for failure to timely and properly serve a party to the proceeding. The State 
represents that UUP has not objected to the late service of its exceptions. However, 
UUP has not filed a response to the exceptions or to PEF's motion. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments on PEF's motion to dismiss, we must dismiss the State's exceptions as 
untimely filed. 
Section 213.2(a) of the Rules requires a party filing exceptions with PERB to also 
serve those exceptions on all other parties within the same 15 working day period and, 
in addition, to file proof of such service with us. It is clear from the record that UUP was 
not served with the State's exceptions within the time frame required and that, therefore, 
1
 PERB's Rules of Procedure, §200.5. 
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no proof of service on UUP was filed with PERB with the State's proof of service on 
PEF. 
In Town/City of Poughkeepsie Water Treatment Facility,2 we stated: 
We have consistently held that timely service upon other 
parties is a component of timely filing. Consequently, we will 
dismiss exceptions that have not been timely served. In prior 
decisions in which we have dismissed exceptions for failure 
of timely service, our decision has been prompted by an 
objection from one or more of the parties who was not timely 
served.(citation omitted) We here determine that requiring 
strict compliance with the filing requirements of our Rules 
with respect to the service of exceptions on all affected 
parties at the same time they are filed with the Board should 
not be dependent upon the urging of one of the parties to the 
proceeding.(citation omitted) 
That UUP has not objected to the late service upon it by the State of its 
exceptions or that PEF objects to the late filing has no bearing on our decision. We 
have held that failure to properly and timely serve exceptions upon the other parties is a 
failure of timely service, warranting dismissal of the exceptions.3 
Based on the foregoing, we do not reach the merits of the State's exceptions. 
The exceptions are dismissed and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State of New York (Office of Mental 
Health-South Beach Psychiatric Center) restore the work of pharmacy management to 
the unit represented by PEF and make whole any unit employees for any loss of wages 
or benefits occasioned by the State's transfer of pharmacy management to employees 
of SUNY's Downstate Medical Center, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
2
 35 PERB 1J3037, at 3105-06 (2002). 
3
 See City of Albany, 23 PERB fl3027 (1990), confd, 181 AD2d 953, 25 PERB 1J7002 
(3dDep't1992). 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State of New York (Office of Mental Health-
South Beach Psychiatric Center) sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to communicate with employees in the unit represented by PEF. 
DATED: October 31, 2003 
Albany, New York 
lichael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Office of Mental Health - South Beach 
Psychiatric Center) in the unit represented by the Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO, that the 
State of New York (Office of Mental Health - South Beach Psychiatric Center) will: 
Forthwith restore the work of pharmacy management to the unit represented by 
PEF and make whole any unit employees for any loss of wages or benefits 
occasioned by the State's transfer of pharmacy management to employees of 
SUNY's Downstate Medical Center, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF 
MENTAL HEALTH - SOUTH BEACH 
PSYCHiATRiC CENTtR) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
i 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-24228 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE, P.C. (STUART LICHTEN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABLE, VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(RHONDA J. MOLL AND EDWARD ZAGAJESKI of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
) 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Transport Workers Union of 
America, Local 100, AFL-CIO (TWU) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing TWU's improper practice charge alleging that the New York City 
Transit Authority (Authority) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it retaliated against Andrew Joseph Saloma after the TWU 
filed improper practice charge U-23862 alleging that the Authority refused Saloma's 
request for union representation during a required physical examination. 
EXCEPTIONS 
TWU excepts to the ALJ's decision on the law and the facts, alleging that the ALJ 
erred by finding the Authority had a legitimate business reason in defense of the instant 
improper practice charge. The Authority filed a brief in opposition to TWU's exceptions 
and in support of the ALJ's decision. 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision.1 We will confine our review 
to the facts relevant to the exceptions. 
In 1983, the Authority employed Saloma as a train conductor. In 1985, the 
Authority promoted him to the position of train operator. As a train operator, the 
Authority required Saloma to undergo biannual physical examinations. 
The record indicates that, on June 21, 2002, Saloma reported to the Authority's • 
Medical Assessment Clinic (MAC) for his biannual physical examination.2 During that 
examination, he admitted to drinking an occasional beer and that he had been in 
"rehab" treatment for substance abuse.3 He was referred to the Authority's 
psychologist, Dr. Mider, for substance abuse evaluation and was evaluated by Dr. Mider 
at the Authority's Psychological Services, a part of the Employees Assistance Program 
(EAP). Dr. Mider recommended that Saloma document proof of completion of a 
chemical dependency relapse prevention education/treatment program of three to four 
weeks duration.4 On July 28, 2002, Dr. Isenberg, at the MAC, referred Saloma to a 
treatment program at Arms Acres with a note requesting that the treatment program 
verify Saloma's participation.5 
1
 36 PERB U4556 (2003). 
2
 Transcript, p. 28. 
3
 Transcript, p. 98. 
4
 Transcript, p. 106. 
5
 Transcript, pp. 109-10. 
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Arms Acres, however, responded to Jose Rosado, associate director of the 
grievance and discipline office of TWU. The letter indicated that Saloma was seen at 
Arms Acres and, after assessment, it was determined that Saloma was not in need of 
substance abuse treatment.6 No one at the Authority received this letter. 
On August 30, 2002, Saloma returned to the MAC with his TWU representative, 
Michael Staton, and requested that Staton observe the examination. Saloma's request 
was denied and he was placed on suspended work status. On September 4, 2002, 
Saloma returned to the MAC with Staton. His request to have Staton present during the 
exam was again denied. On September 5, 2002, Saloma returned to the MAC for 
examination without Staton. At the examination, Saloma provided Dr. Isenberg with a 
copy of the Arms Acres letter to Rosado, which he had not previously received. Dr. 
Isenberg accepted the correspondence as compliance with the referral and returned 
Saloma to work without restrictions. 
On October 8, 2002, the Authority served Saloma with a disciplinary notice for 
refusing to be examined without a TWU representative present. The Authority, 
however, withdrew the disciplinary notice on October 31, 2002. 
On November 14, 2002, TWU filed an improper practice charge (U-23862) 
alleging, inter alia, that the Authority violated the Act when it refused Saloma's request 
for a TWU representative during the examination at the MAC. On April 2, 2003, a 
hearing was held on this charge. Dr. Michelle Alexander, the Authority's assistant vice-
president for occupational health services, testified about the Authority's policy 
forbidding union representation at physical examinations. Dr. Alexander is also a 
certified medical review officer and has the experience and training to be considered a 
6
 Transcript, pp. 111-12. 
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substance abuse professional. Dr. Alexander explained that the medical director of the 
occupational and health services requires periodic audits of employees' medical 
records. Dr. Alexander testified that she also reviews employees' medical files.7 
In preparation for the hearing in U-23862, Dr. Alexander reviewed Saloma's file 
with the Authority's counsel, Daniel Topper. It was during that review process that Dr. 
Alexander discovered that Dr. Isenberg had made a mistake.8 Dr. Alexander found the 
letter from Arms Acres to be nonresponsive to the referral.9 After the hearing on April 2, 
2003, Dr. Alexander conducted a conference call with Drs. Isenberg and Miderto 
discuss the case before she went forward.10 Dr. Alexander testified that Dr. Isenberg 
admitted that he had made a mistake because he did not realize the difference between 
substance abuse treatment and substance abuse relapse prevention education.11 Dr. 
Isenberg agreed to correct the error. He referred Saloma to a treatment program on 
April 11,2003. 
On April 25, 2003, TWU filed the instant charge, which is the subject of this 
appeal. The Authority denied the material allegations of the charge. 
DISCUSSION 
TWU argues that the Authority retaliated against Saloma because he participated 
in a protected activity. The ALJ did find that Saloma would not have been directed to 
7
 Transcript, p. 87. 
8
 Transcript, pp. 89-90, 96. 
9
 Transcript, p. 118. 
10
 Transcript, p. 149. 
11
 Transcript, pp. 122-23. 
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enroll in a substance abuse relapse prevention program butforTWU filing the earlier 
improper practice charge. 
It is axiomatic that the burden of persuasion lies with the charging party to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the public employer acted with 
improper motivation. To establish improper motivation, a charging party must prove that 
he or she had been engaged in protected activities, and that the respondent had 
knowledge of the activities and acted because of those activities. If the charging party 
proves a prima facie case of improper motivation, the burden of going forward shifts to 
the respondent to establish that its actions were motivated by legitimate business 
reasons.12 
The ALJ found that the Authority had a legitimate business reason for its actions, 
even though she found that Saloma would not have been directed to enroll in the 
dependency program had TWU not filed the charge in U-23862. 
Our reasoning in State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 26 
PERB 1J3055 (1993), is applicable here. There we found that there was no violation of 
the Act when hazardous duty pay was eliminated for three employees when the 
erroneous payment of those employees was first discovered during the investigation of 
a grievance. It was not the filing of the grievance, we found, which motivated the 
cessation of the payments to the three employees, but information revealed in the 
investigation of the grievance. Likewise, here, it was not the filing of the prior improper 
practice charge which prompted Alexander to order Saloma to participate in the 
substance abuse relapse prevention program, but Alexander's medical judgment that it 
was best for Saloma after she reviewed his records. Although the information about the 
12
 State of New York (State Univ. of New York-Oswego), 34 PERB 1J3017 (2001). 
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status of Saloma's treatment was first brought to Alexander's attention by the earlier 
improper practice charge, she was entitled to pursue that information and to act based 
upon the results of her review of his records.13 
While the ALJ found the causal connection between the filing of the prior charge 
and the directive to Saloma, the ALJ also found that the record amply demonstrated that 
Alexander made her decision to request Saloma to complete a substance abuse 
relapse prevention program based upon her medical judgment after evaluating 
Saloma's records. The undisputed medical records contained Saloma's admission to 
past dependency on drugs and alcohol and recent social drinking. As a substance 
abuse professional, Alexander formed an opinion based upon her training and 
experience that an alcoholic cannot engage in social drinking. Furthermore, she was 
aware that Saloma, as a train operator, was employed in a safety sensitive position. 
Alexander's decision was also based upon her awareness that an error had been 
committed by one of the Authority's physicians. She was cognizant of the appearance of 
retaliation that might follow her decision to correct this error on the eve of the hearing in 
U-23862. However, Alexander's undisputed testimony was that her decision to correct 
the error was based upon her concern as a substance abuse professional for Saloma's 
safety, as well as the safety of the public. There is no evidence in this record that 
Alexander's decision was motivated by animus toward either the TWU or Saloma. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the TWU's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
Brunswick Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB fl3063 (1986). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: October 31, 2003 
Albany, New York 
&* 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Marc ArAbbotf, Member 
<TM 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VED P. MALHOTRA, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-24384 
- and -
LOCAL 375, DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY 
AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
VED P. MALHOTRA, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Ved P. Malhotra to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing as 
deficient the improper practice charge Malhotra filed alleging that Local 375, District 
Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO 
(Local 375) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it failed to pursue his complaints that he was entitled to an advanced job title 
and/or higher salary from his then-employer, the New York City School Construction 
Authority (Authority). 
Malhotra was advised by the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) that his charge was deficient because he was a 
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retiree and Local 375 owed him no duty of fair representation. He further noted that no 
facts were pled that, if proven, would support a finding that Local 375's conduct while 
Malhotra was an employee was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, especially in 
light of the fact that Local 375 was investigating his claims pursuant to their letter to him 
of April 10, 2003. Malhotra responded that he had not received the assistance he 
sought from Local 375 while he was employed by the Authority. 
The Director thereafter dismissed Malhotra's charge, finding that the charge was 
untimely filed, pursuant to §204.1 (a) of the Rules of Procedure.1 Additionally, the 
Director dismissed the charge for failure to plead any facts which would establish that 
Local 375 breached the duty of fair representation. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Malhotra argues in his exceptions that his case has been on-going since 1992 
and that he has actively pursued it, with repeated requests for assistance from Local 
375. He further alleges that he has brought the case to the Board's attention to avoid 
further delays, now that Local 375 has intervened on his behalf. 
FACTS 
Malhotra had sought Local 375's assistance from December 2001 through 
December 2002. He was advised by Local 375 at that time that his claim was untimely, 
that his job title was consistent with the terms of his hiring and that his salary was 
appropriate under the collective bargaining agreement. Malhotra then retired from the 
Authority's employ on December 2, 2002. Malhotra's charge was filed on July 16, 2003. 
1
 Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure provides that a charge must be filed 
within four months of the action alleged to be improper under the Act. 
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DISCUSSION 
Malhotra's charge is clearly untimely, having been filed more than four months 
after the last action by Local 375 upon which he bases his complaints and years after 
some of the actions alleged to be improper in his charge.2 
Additionally, Malhotra concedes that Local 375 is actively pursuing claims on his 
behalf now. With respect to actions taken after his retirement, Malhotra has no standing 
to file an improper practice charge alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation.3 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of Malhotra's 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: October 31, 2003 
Albany, New York 
lichael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
^Marc A. Abbott, Member 
, < 
Jphn T. Mitchell, Member 
2
 New York State Pub. Empis. Fed'n, 27 PERB H3006 (1994). 
3
 See Greece Cent. Sch. Dist, Greece Teachers Ass'n and NEA (Lanzillo), 28 PERB 
P048 (.1995), confdsub nom, Lanzillo v. PERB, 29 PERB 1J7003 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
County 1996). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES JANAY, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23625 
NEW YORK STATE COURT CLERKS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Employer. 
CHARLES JANAY, pro se 
DUANE MORRIS LLP (EVE I. KLEIN of counsel), for Respondent 
LAUREN P. DeSOLE, CHIEF OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (SHARON B. 
BOWLES of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge filed by Charles Janay alleging that 
the New York State Court Clerks Association (Association) violated §209-a.2(c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to file an Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge on his behalf, refusing to allow him the 
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opportunity to speak with the Association's attorney, failing to assist him in obtaining a 
work transfer and failing to respond to his inquiries about the filing of a grievance. 
Janay's employer, the State of New York - Unified Court System (UCS), is made 
a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Janay excepts to the ALJ's decision on both legal and factual grounds. The 
Association and the UCS support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
A detailed description of the facts is set forth in the ALJ's decision.1 We will 
confine our analysis to the salient facts relevant to our resolution of the exceptions. 
Janay has been employed by UCS in the position of associate court clerk in 
Queens County Supreme Court since about 1996. Janay had been assigned to the 
Court's Kew Gardens facility. After he had worked at Kew Gardens for only about four 
months, Janay inquired about a transfer to the Long Island City facility which would be a 
shorter commute from his home in the Bronx. 
Janay worked with Joel Cohen, an associate court clerk, who was also the 
secretary of the Association. Janay sought Cohen's assistance to effect a transfer to 
UCS's Long Island City facility. Cohen explained to Janay the procedure to request a 
transfer or reassignment. He counseled Janay regarding his right to request a transfer 
J 
1
 36 PERB 1J4555 (2003). 
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but cautioned him that the sole authority to grant such request rested with UCS. Cohen 
interceded on Janay's behalf and had conversations with Anthony DeAngelis, chief 
clerk, Queens County Supreme Court. Cohen also spoke with his contacts in the Bronx 
and Manhattan courts. 
Cohen thought that, as the result of his efforts on Janay's behalf, Janay was 
reassigned to the Long Island City facility in November 2000. However, in February 
2001, Janay was transferred back to Kew Gardens because of a personality conflict 
with the judge to whom he had been assigned. Janay approached Cohen about a 
subsequent transfer back to Long Island City. Cohen advised Janay that the 
Association could not take any action where the member did not have the right to return 
to a specific facility. 
Janay then contacted Kevin Scanlon, the Association president, who advised him 
to file a charge with the EEOC. Janay asked Scanlon to file the charge but he declined 
because the Association does not file that type of charge. Janay pointed out to him that 
the Association had filed such a charge in May 1998 on behalf of a member. 
In his testimony, Janay denied that he was the victim of racial discrimination 
while working at the Long Island City facility. He felt, however, that the Association 
treated some of its members differently when it involved the Association offering 
assistance. Janay used the EEOC complaint as an illustration of the Association's 
disparate treatment. Cohen testified that the EEOC complaint Janay referred to created 
unrest within the Association which led to the Association to decide not to involve itself 
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in any further EEOC complaints.2 
Janay met with the Association's grievance chairperson, Joseph Radice, in an 
effort to persuade the Association to file a contract grievance regarding his desire to 
transfer to the Long Island City facility. Radice explained to Janay that he would 
discuss the situation with the Association's attorney and report back to Janay. Janay 
insisted on speaking directly with the Association's attorney. Radice refused his request 
based upon Association policy. 
Janay wrote to Scanlon in June and July 2002, asking for the Association's 
position regarding his transfer to the Long Island City facility. Janay testified that 
Scanlon never responded. Cohen testified that he spoke with Janay on several 
occasions about these letters. Janay denied having any such conversations with 
Cohen. On August 7, 2002, Janay filed the original improper practice charge and, 
thereafter, amended the charge on August 15, 2002. 
DISCUSSION 
In order to establish a violation of the duty of fair representation under the Act, 
Janay must demonstrate that the Association's actions toward him were arbitrary, 
discriminatory or taken in bad faith.3 The ALJ found that Janay failed to meet his 
burden of proof. We agree. 
2
 The Board takes administrative notice of the improper practice charge filed by Wilfred 
E. Trotman against the Association alleging that the Association violated §§209-a.2(a), 
(b) and (c) of the Act by secretly using Association resources to file a charge with the 
New York City Commission on Human Rights on behalf of certain members of the 
Association. The charge was dismissed. New York State Court Clerks Ass'n, 33 PERB 
^4574 (2000). 
3
 Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d 
Dep't 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB fi7017 (1988). 
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Janay's charge is premised on the fact that the Association failed and refused to 
file an EEOC complaint when it had done so for other members and refused to 
prosecute a contract grievance on his behalf. 
The ALJ credited Cohen's explanation of the Association's position with regard to 
filing EEOC complaints. This record fails to contradict Cohen's testimony or to 
demonstrate that the Association's actions with respect to the EEOC complaint were 
either arbitrary, discriminatory or done in bad faith. 
We must, therefore, determine whether the Association's actions regarding the 
grievance violated the Act. In the absence of proof of arbitrariness, discrimination or 
bad faith,4 a union does not breach its duty of fair representation merely because it 
decides not to file a grievance on behalf of one of its members. We have held that we 
would not substitute our judgment for that of a union's regarding the filing and 
prosecution of grievances, since a union is given a wide range of reasonableness in 
these regards.5 The unrebutted testimony demonstrates that Janay spoke with Radice 
and was informed that the Association would not pursue his grievance and why. The 
Association is under no statutory obligation to agree with Janay's interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement.6 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Janay's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
4
 Id. 
5
 District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB 1J3062 (1995). 
6
 Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 580, AFL-CIO and Central New York Reg'l Transp. 
Auth., 32 PERB P053 (1999). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MOHAMMAD SAIDIN, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-23697 
- and -
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
MOHAMMAD SAIDIN, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MELINDA G. GORDON of 
counsel), for Respondent 
ROBERT WATERS, SUPERVISING ATTORNEY (ORINTHIA PERKINS of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Mohammad Saidin to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge which 
alleged that the United Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) violated 
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§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in the handling of a 
grievance on his behalf. Saidin's employer, the Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (District) is made a statutory party pursuant to §209-a.3 
of the Act. 
Upon motion made by UFT and joined by the District, the ALJ dismissed the 
charge for failure to provide facts which would support a finding of a breach of the duty 
of fair representation, after the pre-hearing conference and after directing Saidin to file 
an offer of proof in support of the allegations in the charge. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Saidin excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by finding his 
amended charge did not plead and prove a prima facie case. UFT supports the ALJ's 
decision; the District has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Saidin's charge stems from the UFT's representation of him in an arbitration 
hearing on a grievance UFT filed challenging a 1999 classroom observation report 
which rated Saidin as unsatisfactory. The arbitrator's decision ordered the District to 
modify portions of the observation report. 
Saidin alleged in his amended improper practice charge that UFT failed to argue 
at the arbitration hearing that certain sections of the collective bargaining agreement 
between UFT and the District were not followed by the District in its conduct of the in-
issue classroom observation and the issuance of the report that followed the 
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observation. Saidin alleged that UFT failed to follow his wishes in its conduct of the 
arbitration because one of the UFT representatives did not like him and that other 
employees' grievances had been processed in reliance upon the contractual provisions 
he relied upon. He also alleged that UFT and the District conspired to breach the duty of 
fair representation at the arbitration hearing. 
After a pre-hearing conference on the charge, Saidin was directed by the 
conference ALJ to file an offer of proof in support of the facts alleged in his charge. 
Saidin's offer consisted of his amended charge, the in-issue observation report, the 
arbitrator's decision, a pamphlet entitled "Security in the Schools" and the UFT-District 
collective bargaining agreement. Thereafter, UFT made a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a cause of action and the District joined in the motion. 
DISCUSSION 
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the charge and the offer of 
proof must be viewed in a light most favorable to the charging party and every 
reasonable inference must be given to the facts alleged by the charging party.1 Here, 
the ALJ held that even if all the facts pled by Saidin were true, the charge would not 
establish a breach of the duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act. 
In order to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation a charging party 
must prove that the employee organization acted in a manner that was arbitrary, 
^County of Nassau (Police Dep't) (Unterweiser), 17 PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
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discriminatory or in bad faith.2 Dissatisfaction with the employee organization's tactics 
or strategy in handling a grievance does not establish a violation of the Act.3 
Here, UFT represented Saidin at the arbitration and succeeded in having some 
of the language in the observation report modified. UFT explained that certain of the 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement upon which Saidin wanted UFT to rely 
were not relevant to his particular case. Even if UFT had been incorrect in its analysis of 
Saidin's grievance, a violation of the Act would not be established because mere 
negligence or error in judgment does not breach the duty of fair representation.4 
Finally, Saidin's allegations that a UFT representative didn't like him, that UFT 
had processed other employees' grievances differently in circumstances similar to his, 
and had conspired with the District against him, are conclusory and cannot form the 
basis of a finding of a violation of the Act.5 Although given the opportunity to do so, 
Saidin did not allege any facts, in either the amended charge or the offer of proof, in 
support of those allegations. 
Based on the foregoing, Saidin's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed. 
2
 Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 
1T7024 (3d Dep't 1987;, affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1f7017 
(1988). 
3Local 1655, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 25 PERB fl3008 (1992). 
4
 Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and State of New York (Div. of Parole), 35 PERB 
1J3023 (2002). 
5
 Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 32 PERB P044 
(1999). 
Board - U-23697 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 31, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michap R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Jvlarc A, Abbott, Member 
JJbhn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASENO.U-23311 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent, 
- and -
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AND 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC. 
Intervenor. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (VALERIE J. AYERS of 
counsel), for Respondent 
HINMAN STRAUB P.C. (WILLIAM F. SHEEHAN of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes before us on exceptions filed by the State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services - Auburn Correctional Facility) (DOCS) and cross-
exceptions filed by Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA), to an interim decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing DOCS' affirmative defenses. The ALJ found that PERB has jurisdiction over 
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the improper practice charge alleging a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and, contrary to CSEA's contention, §205.5(d) of 
the Act is applicable to the charge. 
EXCEPTIONS 
DOCS excepts to the ALJ's interim decision on the law and the facts. 
CSEA, in its cross-exceptions, argues that the ALJ's conclusion of law that our decision 
in Sherburne-Earlville Central School District1 (hereafter, Sherburne-Earlville), is 
dispositive of the issues presented in the instant case, is in error. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
CSEA filed an improper practice charge on April 12, 2002, alleging that DOCS 
violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally assigning certain unit work to two DOCS 
employees in the unit represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA).2 DOCS filed its answer denying the 
material allegations of the charge and alleging certain affirmative defenses, including 
timeliness, waiver and duty satisfaction. 
On February 12, 2003, a hearing was held at which time it was revealed to the 
ALJ that a similar charge had previously been filed by CSEA and withdrawn as the 
result of a settlement agreement. In that charge, U-20434, dated October 29, 1998, 
CSEA alleged that DOCS violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally assigned 
unit work to the same two non-unit employees to whom unit work was allegedly 
1 36PERBp011 (2003). 
2
 NYSCOPA intervened in this proceeding. 
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assigned in this instance. DOCS was represented by counsel from the Governor's 
Office of Employee Relations (OER) in both proceedings. 
On December 2, 1998, CSEA and DOCS' Superintendent of Auburn Correctional 
Facility met to discuss the charge in U-20434 and the underlying work assignment. At 
that meeting, they entered into a written agreement, executed by the local CSEA 
president and vice-president, the maintenance supervisor and superintendent.3 
Thereafter, on January 12, 1999, CSEA requested that its charge U-20434 be 
withdrawn. This request was approved by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director). By letter dated January 22, 1999, the Director informed 
all parties through their counsel and/or representatives that the withdrawal request had 
been approved. 
CSEA, during its opening statement, stated to the ALJ its theory that the instant 
charge, U-23311, was a breach of the settlement agreement reached in U-20434-
As a consequence of this statement, the ALJ limited the scope of the hearing to DOCS' 
affirmative defenses and the ALJ's own inquiry into PERB's jurisdiction. At the 
conclusion of the first day of hearing, the ALJ adjourned the proceedings sine die in 
order to decide these threshold issues. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ's decision was an interim decision.4 As a general rule, this Board will 
not review interlocutory determinations of the Director or an ALJ until such time as all 
3
 The agreement was subsequently approved by DOCS' Assistant Commissioner of 
Labor Relations. 
4
 36 PERB ^4545 (2003). 
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proceedings below have been concluded, and review may be had of the entire matter.5 
By adopting such a policy, the Board avoids the delay inherent in a piecemeal review of 
proceedings and prevents any prejudice and/or inefficient use of administrative 
resources arising from such piecemeal review.6 
Consequently, it is only when extraordinary circumstances are present and/or in 
which severe prejudice would otherwise result if interlocutory review were denied that 
we will entertain a request for such review. This is such a situation. 
DOCS has taken exception to the ALJ's interim decision on the law and the facts. 
DOCS contends that the ALJ erred by finding that PERB has jurisdiction over this 
matter. We agree. The ALJ concluded that the December 2,1998 agreement is not a 
contract or agreement cognizable under the Act and, that PERB has jurisdiction over 
the alleged change in terms and conditions of employment. The ALJ interpreted our 
recent decision in Sherburne-Earlville7 as compelling that conclusion. 
The ALJ's reliance on Sherburne-Earlville in deciding the jurisdictional issue is 
misplaced. Sherburne-Earlville involved the creation of an alleged practice by a 
supervisory employee that favored only certain members of CSEA's district-wide unit 
and existed without the knowledge or consent of the unit's bargaining representative or 
the superintendent of the school district. As we noted in Sherburne-Earlville, CSEA 
failed to prove mutuality in the creation of the alleged practice. Moreover, the ALJ's 
reliance on Hudson Valley District Council of Carpenters v. State of New York, 
5
 County of Nassau, 22 PERB ^3027 (1989). 
6
 United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2 and New York State United Teachers, 32 PERB 
1J3071 (1999) (later history omitted). 
7
 Supra, note 1. 
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Department of Correctional Services8 (hereafter, Hudson Valley), is also misplaced. The 
court in Hudson Valley found that the agreements executed by the superintendents of 
two state correctional facilities were done without the requisite authority. However, the 
court noted that, while the Governor is the chief executive officer of the State, Executive 
Law, Article 24, establishes an Office of Employee Relations (OER). Executive Law 
§650 states, in substance, that OER was created to assist the Governor and direct and 
coordinate the State's efforts with regard to the State's powers and duties under the Act. 
Executive Law, §§650 and 653, designates the Director of OER as the Governor's 
agent in discharging these powers and duties under the Act. In Hudson Valley, OER 
was not involved in the execution of the subject agreements. 
Here, CSEA revealed for the first time to the ALJ at the hearing that the instant 
improper practice charge was a breach of the settlement agreement dated December 2, 
1998. This fact triggered our jurisdictional limitation imposed by §205.5(d) of the Act 
which states: 
the board shall not have authority to enforce an agreement 
between an employer and an employee organization and 
shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of 
such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an 
improper employer or employee organization practice. 
We have held that a jurisdictional determination can be made at any stage of our 
proceedings, and it is properly based on any relevant information before us, however 
that information comes to our attention.9 
B
 152 AD2d 105, 23 PERB 1J7514 (3d Dep't 1989). 
9
 County of Onondaga and Sheriff of Onondaga County, 30 PERB ^3036 (1997). See 
also City of Glens Falls, 25 PERB 1J3011 (1992), cont'd, sub nom. Glens Falls PBA v. 
PERB, 195 AD2d 933, 26 PERB 1J7009 (3d Dep't 1993) (alleged breach of an oral 
agreement revealed for the first time at hearing). 
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CSEA contends that the December 2, 1998 agreement settling U-20434 does not 
comport with the definition of an agreement found in §201.12 of the Act and that the 
jurisdictional limitations imposed by §205.5(d) do not apply. We disagree. This line of 
reasoning adopted by both CSEA and the ALJ is unpersuasive because it ignores the 
facts of this case and our prior decisions. In U-20434, DOCS was represented by OER 
at all stages of the proceeding. The December 2, 1998 agreement resulted from an 
exchange of promises and was executed by the CSEA unit president and vice-president 
and the DOCS facility superintendent. The Director's acceptance of CSEA's withdrawal 
of the charge executed after the December 2, 1998 agreement was noticed to both 
CSEA's representative and counsel from OER. To reason that the December 2, 1998 
agreement resulting in a withdrawal of U-20434 lacked the requisite legal authority and 
mutuality is factually and legally incorrect. The discussions between CSEA and the 
Superintendent of Auburn were entered into with the knowledge of OER and the 
resulting agreement was approved by DOCS itself. 
We have previously held that a settlement agreement acting as a source of right 
to an employee organization divests us of jurisdiction over an improper practice charge 
alleging a violation of such agreement.10 In County of Onondaga,^ a case similar to the 
instant appeal, the Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent Association (DSBA) filed an improper 
practice charge alleging a transfer of unit work in violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. We 
10
 See State of New York (Dep't. of Taxation and Finance), 24 PERB 1J3034, at 3069 
(1991), where we held that "[t]he jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) embraces any 
agreement as defined without regard to form or content. A claimed breach of". . . an 
agreement ancillary to the parties' main contract (footnote omitted) lies as much beyond 
our jurisdiction as a violation of the written collective bargaining agreement." 
11
 Supra, note 9. See also Warsaw Cent. Sch. Dist, 23 PERB 1J3022 (1990); County of 
Suffolk, 22 PERB 1J3033 (1989). 
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had previously determined the exclusivity of the unit work and, as a result of our 
determination, the County entered into a settlement in order to avoid further litigation. 
The DSBA alleged in its subsequent charge a breach of the settlement agreement. The 
ALJ requested briefs on the jurisdictional issue raised by the settlement agreement. 
Subsequently, the ALJ dismissed the charge pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act. We 
affirmed the ALJ's decision but dismissed the charge conditionally pursuant to our 
jurisdictional deferral policy.12 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant DOCS' exception as to our jurisdiction and 
reverse the decision of the ALJ. Since we conditionally dismiss the charge, we need 
not reach at this time the other exceptions raised by DOCS. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
conditionally dismissed, subject to a motion to reopen in accordance with our 
established deferral policy.13 
DATED: October 31, 2003 
Albany, New York 
^1M 
ichael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
4 
Marc A. Abbott, Iwember 
<C.%Mii 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
12
 CSEA, in its cross-exceptions, argues that should we decide to abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction over this charge, it should be conditionally dismissed. See Town 
ofCarmel, 29 PERB tf3073 (1996); County of Suffolk, 22 PERB P033 (1989). 
13
 Herkimer County BOCES, 20 PERB p050 (1987); New York City Transit Auth., 
4PERBP031 (1971). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH MERRICK FACULTY ASSOCIATION, NEW YORK 
STATE UNITED TEACHERS, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5286 
NORTH MERRICK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. / ' ^ 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the North Merrick Faculty Association, New York 
State United Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: Teacher Aides. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the North Merrick Faculty Association, New York State United 
Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: October 31. 2003 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member ' 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-5311 
NEW HYDE PARK-GARDEN CITY PARK UNION 
FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
) 
Certification - C-5311 - 2 -
Included: All regularly scheduled full-time and part-time Cafeteria 
Aides/Monitors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 31, 2003 
Albany, New York 
MLchael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
' ^MarcATAbbott, Member^ 
7iJohn T. Mitchell, IVfember 
